Tightening the Noose around Syria

UPDATED on 28 August 2026

The US – with the help of Israel – has been repeatedly waging attacks against oil tankers bound for Syria. In recent statements to parliament, Syria’s Prime Minister Hussein Arnous revealed that oil tankers loaded with crude allocated for Syria are being attacked or intercepted on the high seas. The goal is to aggravate the oil crisis generated by the economic sanctions and the occupation of over 90% of the territory where Syrian oil wells are located, he detailed.

Arnous said that seven tankers, including some arriving from Iran, had been intercepted in the Red Sea and that two others had been deliberately attacked. US media reports have also described Israeli operations against Iranian oil shipments since late 2019. Officials cited in those reports attributed some incidents to maritime sabotage involving mines and other weapons. The reported consequences included vessels returning to Iranian ports and delays affecting shipments intended for Syria.

Economic War

The disruption of maritime fuel supplies is part of “Washington’s designs on Syria,” to use Stephen Gowans’ words. One important stage came on December 12, 2003, when President George W. Bush signed the Syria Accountability Act. The legislation imposed restrictions on Syria in connection with several demands concerning its foreign and security policies, including its relations with Hezbollah and Palestinian organizations and its weapons programs. It also restricted exports to Syria and contributed to a wider reduction in US economic relations with Damascus.

Additional financial restrictions followed. Measures associated with the USA Patriot Act led the US Treasury Department to direct American financial institutions to end their relationships with the Commercial Bank of Syria. The administration also invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to freeze assets belonging to Syrians regarded as supporting policies opposed by Washington. The sanctions regime thus extended beyond conventional trade restrictions and placed pressure on Syria’s access to international financial channels.

The economic effects of sanctions were reported alongside the wider destruction caused by the war. In 2011, The New York Times described mounting pressure on the Syrian economy. Subsequent reporting in 2012 linked the financial strain to difficulties in maintaining public services, while a later UN-related assessment cited by The Independent described obstacles faced by humanitarian agencies seeking medicines and medical equipment. These reports indicate that sanctions created additional constraints on an economy already severely damaged by conflict.

Washington also provided support to Syrian opposition forces during the Bush administration. The Foreign Operations Appropriation Act of 2005 set aside at least $6.6 million for programs supporting groups opposed to the Syrian government, with further funds available through the same framework. By 2006, US policy had developed relationships with Syrian opposition figures and organizations. The National Salvation Front was among these formations, and representatives associated with it met with officials at the White House during that year.

US assistance also reached the Movement for Justice and Development, an organization established by former members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood that openly supported political change in Damascus. American funding helped the group establish satellite television broadcasting directed toward Syrian audiences. These initiatives formed part of a broader US effort to support opposition political activity and media projects during the years preceding the Syrian uprising.

The Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act added another major layer to the sanctions regime. The measure targeted individuals and companies involved in specified transactions with the Syrian government and placed particular pressure on activities connected with reconstruction. Its provisions affected sectors including construction, electricity, and oil, while sanctioned firms could also face restrictions on access to the US financial system.

The sanctions were imposed during an acute humanitarian crisis. UN figures cited at the time indicated that millions of Syrians were experiencing severe food insecurity, while reports also documented substantial levels of child malnutrition. The sharp depreciation of the Syrian currency and rising food prices further reduced household purchasing power. For many families, these pressures made basic necessities increasingly difficult to obtain.

Aborting Reconstruction

After former president Donald Trump’s incomplete withdrawal from Syria in October 2019, the American agenda altered from fighting ISIS to “protecting” Syrian oil fields. Syrian oil and gas reserves and the infrastructure needed to exploit them are mostly located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in the Deir Ez-Zur and Hasakeh Governorates, although some oil wells are located elsewhere in the occupied Jazira region.

The struggle over northeastern Syria has consequently involved control over resources that could contribute to postwar reconstruction. Major oil-producing areas remain outside the Syrian government’s control, limiting Damascus’s ability to derive public revenue from them. Before the war, Syrian production was sufficient to meet domestic demand while also allowing some exports, and oil revenues constituted a significant component of state income during the second half of the 2000s.

US forces also retain a military position at Al-Tanf in southern Syria, close to the borders with Iraq and Jordan. Its strategic importance derives partly from its position near the road connecting Damascus with Baghdad. The continued US presence has affected movement along this route, which previously served as an important channel for trade between Syria and Iraq. Before the war, bilateral commerce was worth billions of dollars annually, so disruption of this corridor carried consequences for Syria’s wider reconstruction efforts.

The Syrian government has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of US forces from Al-Tanf. Government forces have at times attempted to approach the area, producing confrontations with US troops. In May 2017, US aircraft struck pro-government forces near the base, killing Syrian personnel. Damascus condemned the operation, while Russian officials characterized the attack as a violation of Syrian sovereignty.

No End in Sight

Control over resource-rich territory has also affected Syria’s capacity to recover economically. Areas outside Damascus’s control include important oil-producing regions as well as agricultural land used for wheat cultivation. Restricted access to these resources limits the state’s ability to obtain revenue from energy production and complicates efforts to secure domestic food supplies. These constraints have added another layer of difficulty to reconstruction after years of war.

The position of the principal external actors has remained shaped by different strategic calculations. Washington has opposed jihadist organizations while also seeking to influence the balance of power inside Syria. Israel has focused heavily on limiting Iranian and Hezbollah influence, while also facing the strategic consequences that could follow from a complete collapse of the Syrian state. These overlapping objectives have produced a situation in which external powers pursue partially convergent goals without sharing a single end-state for Syria.

Yanis Iqbal is a student and freelance writer based in Aligarh, India. Read other articles by Yanis.