UPDATED on 28 August 2026
Israel has a long-standing interest in Lebanon. These interests have periodically manifested themselves in bloody attacks against the small Arab state. Two important sources on the Zionist plans for Lebanon are the diary of Moshe Sharett, who was the Prime Minster of Israel in 1954-1955 and who was considered a “soft Zionist”, and Livia Rokach’s “Israel’s Sacred Terrorism: A study based on Moshe Sharett’s Personal Diary, and other documents”. In the latter we find some very important information, and it is worth quoting at length:
Then he [Ben Gurion] passed on to another issue. This is the time, he said, to push Lebanon, that is, the Maronites in that country, to proclaim a Christian State. I said that this was nonsense. The Maronites are divided. The partisans of Christian separatism are weak and will dare do nothing. A Christian Lebanon would mean their giving up Tyre, Tripoli, and the Beka’a. There is no force that could bring Lebanon back to its pre-World War I dimensions, and all the more so because in that case it would lose its economic raison-d’etre. Ben Gurion reacted furiously. He began to enumerate the historical justification for a restricted Christian Lebanon. If such a development were to take place, the Christian Powers would not dare oppose it. I claimed that there was no factor ready to create such a situation, and that if we were to push and encourage it on our own we would get ourselves into an adventure that will place shame on us. Here came a wave of insults regarding my lack of daring and my narrow-mindedness. We ought to send envoys and spend money. I said there was no money. The answer was that there is no such thing. The money must be found, if not in the Treasury then at the Jewish Agency! For such a project it is worthwhile throwing away one hundred thousand, half a million, a million dollars. When this happens a decisive change will take place in the Middle East, a new era will start. I got tired of struggling against a whirlwind.
The next day Gurion sent Sharett a letter which contained the following argument:
It is clear that Lebanon is the weakest link in the Arab League. The other minorities in the Arab States are all Muslim, except for the Copts. But Egypt is the most compact and solid of the Arab States and the majority there consists of one solid block, of one race, religion and language, and the Christian minority does not seriously affect their political and national unity. Not so the Christians in Lebanon. They are a majority in the historical Lebanon and this majority has a tradition and a culture different from those of the other components of the League. Also within the wider borders (this was the worst mistake made by France when it extended the borders of Lebanon), the Muslims are not free to do as they wish, even if they are a majority there (and I don’t know if they are, indeed, a majority) for fear of the Christians. The creation of a Christian State is therefore a natural act; it has historical roots and it will find support in wide circles in the Christian world, both Catholic and Protestant.
Sharett responded a few weeks later:
As far as I know, in Lebanon today exists no movement aiming at transforming the country into a Christian State governed by the Maronite community…This is not surprising. The transformation of Lebanon into a Christian State as a result of an outside initiative is unfeasible today… I don’t exclude the possibility of accomplishing this goal in the wake of a wave of shocks that will sweep the Middle East… will destroy the present constellations and will form others. But in the present Lebanon, with its present territorial and demographic dimensions and its international relations, no serious initiative of the kind is imaginable.
[I should add that] I would not have objected, and on the contrary I would have certainly been favorable to the idea, of actively aiding any manifestation of agitation in the Maronite community tending to strengthen its isolationist tendencies, even if there were no real chances of achieving the goals; I would have considered positive the very existence of such an agitation and the destabilization it could bring about, the trouble it would have caused the League, the diversion of attention from the Arab-Israeli complications that it would have caused, and the very kindling of a fire made up of impulses toward Christian independence. But what can I do when such an agitation is nonexistent?…In the present condition, I am afraid that any attempt on our part would be considered as lightheartedness and superficiality or worse-as an adventurous speculation upon the well being and existence of others and a readiness to sacrifice their basic good for the benefit of a temporary tactical advantage for Israel…Moreover, if this plan is not kept a secret but becomes known a danger which cannot be underestimated in the Middle Eastern circumstances-the damage which we shall suffer… would not be compensated even by an eventual success of the operation itself.
Civil War
The opportune moment for Israeli machinations arrived when a civil war broke out in Lebanon, involving a sectarian battle between Christians, who had monopolized politico-economic power, and Muslims, who lived in poverty and deprivation. These internal imbalances were exacerbated by the large presence of Palestinian refugees who – fearing a repeat of the September 1970 massacre in Jordan at the hands of Christians – were compelled to ally with the Muslims and their allies, namely Baathists, Communists, Nasserites and others. On April 9, 1976, the Syrian military intervened to fight against the National Movement (NM) and Palestinians. Kamal Jumblatt – the leader of the NM – was too radical for the liking of Damascus. With his anti-Zionist leanings, he could easily provoke Israel into invading Lebanon – increasing the strategic vulnerability of Syria. Thus, Hafez al-Assad proceeded to thwart any possibility of a leftist regime coming to power in Beirut.
Israel began cultivating ties with Maronite communities along the southern Lebanese frontier in 1976. The policy included opening crossings with villages near the border and supporting Christian forces that were resisting Palestinian and Muslim militias. Israeli assistance also helped these local forces consolidate a territorial foothold in the south. Major Sa’ad Haddad emerged as the principal Lebanese military partner in this arrangement, and the force associated with him eventually became the South Lebanese Army (SLA).
Israeli support for Haddad’s forces expanded before Menachem Begin assumed the premiership in May 1977. Maronite fighters were transported from Junieh to Haifa for military training, after which they returned to participate in the fighting around the southern enclave. The Likud government subsequently made this relationship more systematic, providing the SLA with sustained military assistance and allowing Israeli forces to conduct operations across the Lebanese border.
The 1978 Litani Operation followed a Fatah attack in Israel that killed 37 people. Beginning on March 14, the Israeli military moved into southern Lebanon and advanced toward the Litani River with approximately 25,000 troops. The stated objective was to push Palestinian forces away from the frontier and destroy their bases, while the operation also strengthened Haddad’s territorial position in the south. Palestinian forces were driven north of the Litani, while large numbers of civilians fled the fighting. Israel subsequently withdrew after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 425, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and established an international force in the area. Israeli positions were then transferred to Haddad’s militia, while the arrival of UNIFIL failed to end the conflict along the frontier.
Operation Peace for Galilee
Barely ten months later, on June 6, 1982, Israel launched a massive land, sea and air invasion of Lebanon code-named “Operation Peace for Galilee”. It was given covert consent by the US. In a speech given before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on May 28, 1982, then Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. said: “Lebanon today is a focal point of danger…and the stability of the region hangs in the balance…The Arab deterrent force [instituted in 1976 to end Syrian killings of Palestinians and Muslim forces], now consisting entirely of Syrian troops, with its mission to protect the integrity of Lebanon, has not stabilized the situation…The time has come to take concerted action in support of both Lebanon’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and a strong central government capable of promoting a free, open, democratic and traditionally pluralistic society.” With the ostensible goal of destroying Palestinian infrastructure, Israel invaded Lebanon with 60,000 troops, 800 tanks, attack helicopters, bombers and fighter planes, supported by missile boats, and spread pure terror in Muslim-inhabited areas. Over 15,000 Lebanese perished in the invasion, mostly civilians. Israel claimed portions of Lebanese territory and placed militias within Lebanon.
Upon reaching Beirut, the IDF began a nine-week siege, including saturation bombing and intermittent blockades of food, fuel, and water. On June 26, the US vetoed a UNSC resolution for an end to hostilities (saying it was “a transparent attempt to preserve the PLO as a viable political force.”) But sensing the siege’s impact on public opinion, former US President Ronald Reagan had Philip Habib begin talks for a cease-fire. Habib demanded that the PLO leave Lebanon. Even after this was agreed to, the IDF continued bombing, killing 300 on August 12, 1982. Reagan then told Begin to halt the “unfathomable and senseless” raids. Even the Israeli Cabinet was taken aback and stripped Sharon of the right to activate forces without higher approval.
Israel also sought to translate its military intervention into political influence in Beirut. Bashir Gemayel, the leading figure among the pro-Israeli Christian forces, became the principal beneficiary of this strategy. His election was secured at the Fiyadiya barracks through a combination of Phalangist security and Israeli pressure on Lebanese parliamentarians. Sharon and other Israeli officials reportedly used political pressure and financial inducements, including an effort to bring an elderly parliamentarian from an isolated Beqa’a village to the voting site. Gemayel’s elevation therefore represented a major Israeli effort to reshape Lebanon’s political leadership through military intervention.
On September 16, 1982, Phalangist forces entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps after Israeli troops had established positions around the area. The militia members, associated with Bashir Gemayel and reportedly commanded by Elie Hobeika, carried out a massacre over the following days, with members of Haddad’s forces also reportedly participating. Israeli forces had assumed responsibility for the security environment surrounding the camps, yet failed to intervene as the killings unfolded. The massacre produced widespread outrage inside Israel and intensified opposition to the continuation of the war. Thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese were killed, with women, children and elderly people among the victims.
Increasing Resistance
After Bashir Gemayel’s assassination, Israel turned toward his brother Amin as a possible political partner and sought to advance a US-mediated settlement. Amin lacked the political strength that Israeli planners had expected from Bashir. At the same time, mounting Israeli casualties and domestic pressure encouraged a gradual withdrawal. In August 1983, Israeli forces began leaving the Shuf mountains, where they had become involved in the struggle between the Phalange and Druze forces associated with Walid Jumblatt. When Jumblatt’s militia threatened Souk al-Gharb and the approaches to the presidential complex, Amin appealed to Washington for assistance. The United States subsequently withdrew its forces amid escalating resistance in Lebanon.
A broader coalition opposed to Amin Gemayel, Israel and the United States was taking shape during this period. Among its less prominent elements were Shiite militants who had begun organizing with assistance from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the Biqa. Israel’s withdrawal toward the Awali River removed its forces from Beirut but left a substantial occupation presence in predominantly Shiite southern Lebanon. This changed the character of the resistance Israel faced. Amal remained the principal Shiite political and military organization, while a smaller Iranian-backed movement, Hezbollah, gradually developed into a more formidable opponent.
For roughly two further years, Israeli forces remained along the Awali line while Hezbollah expanded its appeal by combining opposition to the occupation with a broader Shiite Islamist political project. The 1983 peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon was subsequently abandoned, and attacks by Hezbollah and Amal continued. In June 1985, Israel withdrew farther south and retained a security zone along the border in cooperation with the SLA. Israeli forces later conducted major incursions beyond this zone in 1993 and 1996, launching Operations Accountability and Grapes of Wrath in efforts to pressure Hezbollah.
The continued occupation also generated growing opposition within Israel. A helicopter disaster in 1997 that killed 73 soldiers intensified public criticism, while the death of twelve naval commandos in September of the same year further weakened support for the deployment. Ehud Barak won the 1999 election after promising to bring the troops back to Israel’s internationally recognized border. The withdrawal began on May 22, 2000 and accelerated as the SLA collapsed. Israeli forces left behind military equipment that was subsequently captured by Hezbollah, some of which was later displayed in southern Lebanon as a symbol of the withdrawal.
The Israeli withdrawal strengthened Hezbollah’s standing among many Lebanese who had experienced the occupation. The Khiam detention centre became one of the most visible symbols of that experience. Prisoners had been held there outside ordinary judicial procedures, amid allegations of systematic torture and severe mistreatment. Following the Israeli withdrawal, residents entered the facility and freed the 144 detainees who remained. Accounts of former prisoners, including Suleiman Ramadan, describe prolonged detention, physical abuse and serious medical neglect. His case illustrates the broader coercive conditions associated with the detention centre.
2006 Attack
Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon was directed principally against Hezbollah. Israeli planners sought to disrupt the organization’s supply routes, damage its military infrastructure, reduce its fighting capacity and remove senior leaders. The initial strategy relied heavily on air power and a naval blockade, while Israeli ground forces prepared to advance through southern Lebanon. The campaign was therefore designed to combine attacks on Hezbollah’s material infrastructure with pressure intended to weaken its political and military position.
The aerial bombardment caused extensive civilian casualties and severe damage across Lebanon, yet it failed to eliminate Hezbollah’s capacity to continue fighting. The organization sustained rocket attacks against Israel throughout the conflict, while Israeli ground units encountered stronger resistance than their commanders had anticipated. The Israeli leadership subsequently debated whether to continue relying on air power and limited incursions or expand the ground operation. A larger offensive was eventually ordered toward the Litani, but its scope remained limited and a ceasefire followed soon afterward. The war caused more than 1,100 deaths, displaced over one quarter of Lebanon’s population and produced billions of dollars in damage, yet Israel failed to achieve a decisive political outcome in Lebanon.