Internal Sovereignty: The People as Declared Source, Power as a Device of Continuity
Algeria in the 2020-2026 period constitutes a paradigmatic case of adaptive authoritarianism: a state that preserves the grammar of revolutionary and anticolonial legitimation while reorganizing the instruments of political control around the continuity of the military, administrative, and presidential apparatus. The Hirak movement, which erupted in February 2019 against Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s fifth term, had transformed the public square into a collective political subject, challenging not only the president, but the entire system of intermediation among society, party, bureaucracy, and armed forces. The suspension of demonstrations during the pandemic and the subsequent election of Abdelmadjid Tebboune did not resolve the question of representation; rather, they enabled an institutional recomposition that left the underlying balance of power substantially intact. The September 2024 presidential reelection confirmed the persistence of this equilibrium without producing any significant reopening of the political space.
The 2020 Constitution declares, in Article 7, “Le peuple est la source de tout pouvoir” (“The people are the source of all power”) and, in Article 8, “Le pouvoir constituant appartient au peuple” (“Constituent power belongs to the people”). This dual enunciation constructs a principle of popular sovereignty that, on a pragmatic level, operates as an act of legitimation: the text attributes the original ownership of power to the people and its representation to the institutions.
The problem emerges in the gap between the illocutionary force of the norm and the actual conditions of its implementation. Sovereignty is proclaimed as constitutional common ground, yet political participation encounters restrictions, judicial proceedings, and constraints on freedom of association and assembly. The relationship between enunciation and praxis becomes the decisive site of the crisis: naming the people as the source of power is insufficient if the instruments through which they might exercise it remain subject to control. Mohammed Hachemaoui’s reflection in “Qui gouverne (réellement) l’Algérie?” (in Politique africaine, no. 142, 2016) is instructive because it interrogates the actual distribution of authority behind the institutional facade. The author’s formulation, “rendre invisible le régime institutionnel que la police secrète a forgé durant un quart de siècle” to render invisible the institutional regime that the secret police forged over a quarter of a century”), should be read as an interpretive key to opaque power rather than an exhaustive description of contemporary Algeria. Lahouari Addi, in his studies on the relations among army, nation, and state, had identified the centrality of the military structure in shaping the Algerian political order. Dalia Ghanem, in Understanding the Persistence of Competitive Authoritarianism in Algeria (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), defines the system as a form that is “distinctly competitive and adaptable”: a characterization that helps explain how circumscribed electoral competition, controlled pluralism, and the capacity to absorb dissent can coexist.
The category of necropolitics, developed by Achille Mbembe in Necropolitics (Duke University Press, 2019), expands the analysis beyond the functioning of institutions: “The ultimate expression of sovereignty largely resides in the power and capacity to dictate who is able to live and who must die.” This quotation allows us to examine the relationship among security, coercion, and the differential management of populations. Sovereignty does not coincide solely with territorial control; it encompasses the authority to define which forms of dissent are tolerable, which subjects may access the public sphere, and which behaviors are categorized as threats. The Algerian crisis is not a democratic deficit; it is a dispute over the concrete ownership of political agency.
Regional Sovereignty: Western Sahara, Morocco, and the Dissolution of Sahelian Mediation
Algerian foreign policy unfolds within a structural contradiction: the defense of non-interference and the self-determination of peoples is accompanied by intense competition over border security and influence in the Maghreb and the Sahel. The conflict with Morocco represents the primary axis of this tension. The severing of diplomatic relations in August 2021 transformed a historical rivalry into a strategic confrontation in which Western Sahara constitutes at once a legal issue, an anticolonial symbol, and an instrument of geopolitical positioning.
For Algiers, support for Sahrawi self-determination is part of its diplomatic identity; for Rabat, international recognition of its autonomy plan represents a lever for territorial consolidation and external projection. Laurence Thieux and Raouf Farrah, in their article “Algeria and Western Sahara: reactivating the principle of just cause in the post-Hirak era” (in The Journal of North African Studies, 2025, 691-719), demonstrate how the Sahrawi issue was reinforced by the transformation of the domestic and international context following the Hirak.
The phrase “principle of just cause” describes the framework through which Algeria presents the dossier: rather than a bilateral dispute, it is framed as a matter of decolonization and self-determination. This framing serves a precise pragmatic function: it aligns foreign policy with the state’s foundational narrative and converts a territorial controversy into a criterion of international legitimacy. Its effectiveness depends on preventing the principle from being perceived merely as an instrument of regional rivalry. Hamza Meddeb, in Economic Statecraft as Geopolitical Strategy: New Dimensions of Moroccan-Algerian Rivalry (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 22, 2025), identifies the extension of this competition into economic instruments. Both countries use energy, trade, and the control of migration flows to build alliances and strengthen their bargaining power. The concept of “economic statecraft” allows pipelines, trade agreements, and market access to be read as mechanisms of power. Competition is not confined to diplomacy; it enters infrastructure, supply chains, and relations with the European Union. France, through its rapprochement with the Moroccan position on Western Sahara, reactivated a historical fault line in which colonial memory, political recognition, and contemporary interests overlap.
The Sahel constitutes the second front of Algerian vulnerability. The Malian crisis, the coups d’état in Niger and Burkina Faso, the expansion of jihadist groups, and the growing presence of external actors have narrowed the operational space of Algeria’s traditional mediation diplomacy. Algeria had brokered the 2015 Algiers Accords on Mali, anchoring its influence in political negotiation and regional conflict management. Their progressive breakdown and the 2025 tensions with Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou exposed the fragility of that architecture.
Lotfi Sour’s contribution, Algeria’s Role in the African Sahel: Toward a New Security Paradigm (2022), summarizes Algerian doctrine as a preference for “political and diplomatic mechanisms over those of the military.” This formulation captures a strategic constant subjected to growing strain when regional interlocutors no longer recognize Algiers as a privileged mediator. Charitini Petrodaskalaki, in Algeria’s New Foreign Policy Era (CEMMIS, January 26, 2025, updated March 2026), observes that “its influence is declining in the very unstable Sahel region.” This decline does not equate to the disappearance of Algerian military or diplomatic capabilities; rather, it signals the difficulty of converting resources and geographic proximity into political outcomes. Sid Yakoub, in his 2025 contribution Algeria’s Stance on the Sahel Crises: Between Doctrinal Constants and Geopolitical Shifts (2012–2025), uses the term “calculated confrontation” to describe a posture in which the defense of doctrinal constants coexists with adaptation to shifting regional conditions. The Sahel crisis lays bare the limits of Algerian power: a strategy built on mediation risks losing efficacy when the region fragments into military regimes, shifting alliances, and competing security architectures.
Global Sovereignty: Energy Rent, Multipolarity, and the Crisis of International Projection
Algeria’s international standing relies on a decisive resource: hydrocarbons. Natural gas and oil sustain public revenues, underwrite spending capacity, and grant the country a significant role in European energy security. The war in Ukraine and the reconfiguration of energy relations between Europe and Russia increased the importance of Algerian supplies, particularly for Italy, which is linked via the TransMed pipeline. This centrality yields bargaining leverage without resolving the structural vulnerability of an economy exposed to price volatility and dependence on energy exports. The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 Article IV report estimates real GDP growth at 3.9% in 2025 and 3.8% in 2026, while highlighting high fiscal deficits, a deteriorating current account, and declining reserves. The overall fiscal deficit is projected at 10.5% of GDP in 2025 and 9.6% in 2026, while the current account deficit reached 8.9% of GDP in 2025. Growth, therefore, does not automatically translate into diversification. Energy rent operates as a mechanism of political organization: it finances transfers, subsidies, and public investments, reducing pressure for a profound transformation of state-society relations. The issue is not merely economic. It is anthropological, because resource distribution shapes collective expectations; it is sociological, because it entrenches dependencies among the state apparatus, enterprises, and citizens; and it is political, because the availability of rents can dampen conflict without removing its root causes.
The lexicon of diversification becomes a performative promise: it heralds a productive future that must still materialize into an effective reduction of hydrocarbon dependence. Multipolar competition adds a further layer of complexity. Russia maintains a strategic and military relationship with Algiers; China is active in infrastructure, investment, and trade; the United States retains an interest in Mediterranean and Sahelian security; and the European Union views Algeria as both an energy partner and an actor in containing migration crises. Algeria seeks to avoid exclusive subordination, maximizing its diplomatic autonomy. Dario Cristiani, in his analysis Algeria as a Geopolitical Actor: Strategic Dynamics and Regional Implications (Stimson Center, May 11, 2026), encapsulates this posture as «a strategic culture rooted in sovereignty and restraint». Sovereignty serves as an identity and bargaining resource; restraint acts as a doctrine of risk containment. The limitation emerges when caution hardens into immobility and a plurality of partners fails to generate greater autonomous capacity for initiative. Mahmood Mamdani’s argument in Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity (Harvard University Press, 2012) helps clarify how political categories are not neutral descriptions, but instruments that organize power relations. Applied carefully to the Algerian context, this perspective invites scrutiny of the discursive construction of threats: terrorism, separatism, foreign interference, and destabilization risk becoming categories used to demarcate the boundaries of legitimacy.
Wendy Brown, in In the Ruins of Neoliberalism (Columbia University Press, 2019), reminds us that “Political equality is democracy’s foundation.” This principle introduces a substantive measure of legitimacy: the existence of representative institutions is insufficient if the conditions of access to participation remain unequal. Categories from literary criticism and art theory offer useful interpretive tools here. Focalization distinguishes the state’s point of view from that of society; framing shows how the representation of threat shapes public perception; deixis identifies who is included in the pronoun “we” and who is positioned outside the national community.
Social psychology and the neuroscience of perception further demonstrate that fear, uncertainty, and belonging shape the reception of political messages: the repetition of a threat can consolidate interpretive schemas and reduce openness to alternatives. Art and cultural production are not extraneous to this process: they can either reproduce the official national narrative or introduce forms of ostranenie-defamiliarization — capable of rendering habitualized contradictions visible once again. Ultimately, the Algerian question is not whether the country possesses sufficient resources to be a regional power, it does. Rather, it is whether it can convert those resources into durable political capacity. Energy centrality is no substitute for diversification; military superiority does not guarantee mediation; proclaimed sovereignty does not coincide with effective participation. Between 2020 and 2026, Algeria preserved substantial international autonomy while facing growing difficulties in renewing its domestic social contract and managing the fragmentation of the Sahel. Its future will depend on its ability to reconcile these three levels: internal legitimacy, regional influence, and global autonomy. Without such a recomposition, sovereignty risks remaining a potent formula in official discourse yet incomplete in political reality.










