What should we make of the latest pause in the US/Israeli war against Iran?
I realize that for readers of this journal, others who do not take at face value what they are told by the mainstream media, the increasing number who do not believe anything that the US government and its President say, and everyone in Iran, this is a rhetorical question of such crashingly obvious proportions that it is barely worth asking.
But it is important nevertheless to remind ourselves of the extensive grounds upon which such a conclusion rests and on that basis to speculate briefly about what is likely to happen next and when.
What we know
US and Israeli economic and military aggression against Iran has been continuous and has increased steadily since the Shah was toppled in 1979 and replaced by a democratically elected government. That constitutes almost half a century of unrelenting, carefully calculated, lethal nastiness by governments of all political persuasions in the US and Israel.
The reasons for this are well known. For the US, Iran is pivotal to the control of the Middle East and possesses substantial energy and other resources that US corporations want to get their hands on.
For Israel, Iran is the main impediment to a Greater Israel, not least because it possesses the raw material and technical know-how to produce nuclear weapons. Humane and responsible countries like Israel are allowed to have such weapons. Iran is not. The Western world accepts this logic.
None of this has changed.
If anything, the Israeli position has hardened and become more desperate. Made so partly by the parlous state of its armed forces, which reportedly are stretched to the limit and suffering from low morale; by the increasingly fractious relationship with President Trump who is under severe political pressure to ease the economic pain in the US caused by Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and the disruption of energy supplies and the supply of other essential commodities such as fertiliser; and by the knowledge that the more time that goes by, the stronger and more prepared Iran will be for a resumption of hostilities.
Israel needs time to recover, repair, and manage relations with the US President, but it cannot wait too long. It is a fine balancing act.
All the while Netanyahu and Israeli hawks are as determined as ever to destroy Iran and reduce it to a Syria-like state of dismemberment. To some degree, the political future of Netanyahu depends as much on achieving this aim as the short-term political prospects of the US President depend on a pause and some economic breathing space, perhaps until after the mid-term US elections in early November.
Israel has a strong hand to play. It can end the ceasefire whenever it chooses by resuming attacks on Lebanon. This constant threat hangs over the negotiations and ceasefire.
The Israel lobby in the US remains a crucial source of pressure on Trump et al.
Informed opinion also suggests that Israel has leverage over President Trump that could include salacious details surrounding his relationship with Epstein. Trump seems like a plausible candidate for this, and his name comes up 1,800 times in the Epstein files.
For its part, the US still wants from Iran the things that it wanted before, perhaps more urgently now because a resurgent Iran in partnership with Russia and China threatens to replace it in the region or, at the very least, greatly reduce US influence there.
If accepted as a basis for discussion and all or most of them are incorporated into an agreement, the points in Iran’s offer amount to a US ‘surrender’. This would be unprecedented and politically disastrous, as Trump would lose ‘face’ and credibility with a significant proportion of his electoral base.
The main points in the Iranian proposal are (following the themedialine and Al Jazeera):
1. Immediate ceasefire: A permanent end to military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon.
2. Sanctions and assets: The suspension of U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil and petrochemical products, access to revenues, and the release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets. Half of the latter funds to be handed over before negotiations begin.
3. US and regional guarantees: A commitment from the US to withdraw its military forces from areas around Iran and a US pledge of non-interference in Iran’s internal affairs.
4. Maritime and trade: Lifting of the naval and maritime blockade against Iran within 30 days and establishing a new management mechanism for the Strait of Hormuz controlled by Iran.
5. Reconstruction: A reconstruction package of $300 billion.
6. Nuclear issues: Agreement to negotiate nuclear issues for a period of 60 days and the removal of sanctions imposed by the US, the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran would formally reaffirm its adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and restate that it does not seek nuclear weapons.
7. Negotiation agenda: Specifically excludes Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support for allied regional groups.
8. Removal of pressure: The United States to refrain from increasing troop deployments in the region or imposing new sanctions while negotiations continue.
9. Monitoring and verification mechanism: A system to be established to oversee compliance with commitments undertaken by both parties.
10. United Nations ratification: Any final agreement to be endorsed by a United Nations Security Council resolution.
11. Conditions and scope of final negotiations: Final negotiations not to begin until half of Iran’s frozen funds have been released, energy sanctions have been suspended, and naval restrictions have been lifted.
In effect, Iran is dictating the terms of negotiation and, if reached, the eventual agreement.
However, neither the US nor Israeli governments can be trusted. They have no integrity. The US can never be relied on to keep its word or to abide by agreements. It routinely flouts international law and UN conventions to which it is a signatory.
Traditionally, the US has only engaged in one-sided (the emperor decides) ‘negotiations’ that are not conducted in good faith, and are frequently used as (admittedly, flimsy) cover for military attacks.
In particular, the present US government will not like being ‘dictated to’ by a ‘regime of fanatical mullahs’ or for that to be seen to be the case, either domestically by hardline Trump supporters in the US or internationally.
On the contrary, the US and Israel are accustomed to getting their way and using lethal violence and economic means to do so: military invasion, carpet bombing, decapitation strikes, abductions of sitting presidents, genocide, piracy, sanctions, freezing of assets, blockades, and so on. These methods are their stock in trade.
Diplomacy with ‘cockroaches’ or ‘rag heads’ and their close relatives simply does not make sense.
In addition, many of the items on Iran’s list are known to be unacceptable to the US – particularly, numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 above. Whatever might be said to maintain the ceasefire for as long as the US sees fit, the US government is unlikely to change its mind about such matters
In the unlikely event that negotiations get to the point of a signed agreement, there are no ‘fool-proof’ means for ensuring that the agreement reached will be honored. A UN resolution would be worthless, as would a ‘monitoring mechanism.’
The leaders of the US and Israel are inhumane, narcissistic sociopaths who control their countries’ nuclear arsenals. As noted elsewhere, their deep need for constant admiration leaves them highly sensitive to criticism or perceived failure and quick to respond with rage, contempt, and vicious retaliation.
Iran’s political and military standing has been enhanced by the latest wars against it, which many observers consider it to have won. Its performance in these wars, which has enhanced its status – crucially, with China and Russia – and confidence, makes it highly unlikely that it will concede on any of its main negotiating positions.
Clearly, these are not the conditions for agreement to be reached or, if reached, such agreement to last.
Portents
All parties to the war need and want a break in hostilities. The US will want to relieve economic pressure and be seen as having managed a reasonable resolution to the conflict, at least until after the mid-term elections.
Israel needs to rest and refresh its troops and work to restore ‘normal’ service from the US.
Both the US and Israel need time to replenish weapons and systems of war and to work on a strategy that can penetrate the intricate and effective defenses of Iran (whether this is feasible is another matter).
Knowing that a permanent and enforceable agreement with the US is impossible, Iran will want to spin out negotiations for as long as possible so that it can recover and prepare for the next onslaught.
If Iranian leaders are persuaded by analysts like Sergei Karaganov, and have not already acted accordingly, they may use this pause to pursue nuclear weapons and consider nuclear testing and the possibility of limited nuclear strikes in the region. Karaganov argues that the war in Ukraine has shown that simply possessing nuclear weapons is not enough to stop adversaries from crossing Russian red lines, as Ukraine and its European backers have done repeatedly. In his view, the West no longer fears nuclear Armageddon and must be forced to fear it again.
At best, it seems probable that Israel will hold off on its attacks on Lebanon and its pressure on President Trump to resume US/Israeli attacks on Iran until after the mid-term US elections in early November.
Thereafter, a resumption of hostilities by the US and Israel seems inevitable with heightened risks of significant escalation.